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Executive summary 
 
The Kyoto Protocol from 1997 left undecided a number of rules required to make it operational. In 
1998, at a climate meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the Parties to the Climate Convention agreed 
to start negotiations on the required rules. After three years of negotiations, the rules of the Kyoto 
Protocol were finalized at the climate meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, in October-November 2001. 
The original plan was to finalize the rules by autumn 2000, but this failed primarily due to 
disagreement between the USA and the EU on accounting of carbon storage in forest and land-use 
sinks. A further complication arose in March 2001 when the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the 
USA, stated that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, the other Parties decided to continue 
without the USA. A number of concessions had to be given to get support from the must reluctant 
countries – Japan, Canada, Russia and Australia. This means that the resulting greenhouse gas 
mitigating effect of the Kyoto Protocol is smaller than many had anticipated back in 1997. 
Nevertheless, a major political step has been taken globally since the Kyoto Protocol now is ready for 
ratification and is likely to enter into force within 1-2 years. 
 
The rules of the Kyoto Protocol specify procedures for emission accounting; allowable amounts of 
crediting from forest activities and other carbon sink relevant activities; eligibility for use of the three 
mechanisms for international quota trading; fungibility between the mechanisms; banking of quotas to 
the next target period; accreditation of operating entities; and rules for compliance to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
 
For business and industry, a global climate policy regime is a landmark that shows that firms must 
prepare for a low-carbon future. New markets for carbon quotas are emerging, and these are linked to 
growing markets in green technologies. The first target period for the Kyoto Protocol is 2008–12, but 
negotiations on the next target period will commence by 2005. The next targets can be more ambitious 
than the present (which is to reduce emissions of the six major greenhouse gases in industrialized 
countries by 5.2% in 2008–12 compared to 1990). The next targets can be more ambitious and at some 
stage involve developing countries, which have no commitments in the first target period. 
 
The next phase is implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in each country. Many countries have started 
preparations already, and some have initiated domestic emissions trading systems. The EU has plans 
to establish a regional emissions trading system by 2005. It is already possible to accrue credits from 
projects 2000 onwards in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
The Kyoto Protocol provides guidance for national authorities to start developing the necessary 
legislation. Companies that enter the emerging carbon markets early will take some risk but will also 
benefit from learning and being able to position themselves in new and growing international markets. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this report is to present the newest developments in the climate negotiations, 
particularly from part two of the sixth Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention 
(COP6-2) in Bonn in July 2001 and COP7 in Marrakech, Morocco, in October/November 
2001, and to present an evaluation of what the finalized Kyoto Protocol means for business.1 
The report builds on an earlier report on the Bonn agreement (Torvanger 2001). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in December 1997, but has not yet entered into force since 
not enough countries have ratified the Protocol. At the fourth Conference of the Parties in 
Buenos Aires in November 1998, the “Buenos Aires Plan of Action” was adopted, with the 
aim to develop a final regulatory framework for the Kyoto Protocol over the next two years. 
However, the sixth Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (COP6-1) in The 
Hague in November 2000 failed to reach consensus on the remaining issues. After the 
American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, the future of the Protocol seemed 
bleaker than ever before. Despite many observers having low expectations for COP6-2 in 
Bonn in July 2001, a number of Parties, particularly the EU, showed enough flexibility to 
make an accord, the so-called Bonn agreement, possible.2 After hard negotiations during the 
last four days (and nights) of the conference, the agreement was adopted on 23 July. The 
negotiations on remaining rules and details continued at COP7 in Marrakech, Morocco, 29 
October until 9 November 2001, where the text was finalized so as to make the Kyoto 
Protocol ratifiable.  
 
Still there is no guarantee that the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force. For it to do so, 
industrialized countries representing at least 55% of carbon dioxide emissions among this 
group of countries in 1990 would have to ratify the Protocol. Without American ratification 
this means that most other industrialized countries have to ratify. Due to their large share of 
1990 emissions, Russia and Japan are two pivotal countries in this context. The negotiations 
showed that Japan, Russia, Australia, and Canada might be the countries that are most 
reluctant to ratify. Some Parties to the Protocol have expectations that it might enter into force 
by the new global summit “Rio plus ten” in South Africa in September 2002. This might be 
possible, but it is more likely that the Kyoto Protocol could enter into force by the end of 
2002 or the first half of 2003. The next Conference of the Parties, COP8, will take place 23 
October to 1 November 2002, probably in New Delhi, India. 
 
In the next section of this report, a short analysis of the negotiation positions of major Parties 
with regard to four important topics is presented, in both a static and dynamic perspective. 
Then in section 3 the main contents of the Bonn and Marrakech agreements are presented, 
divided into the four main areas of i) compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, ii) sinks (i.e. land-
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)), iii) the Kyoto mechanisms (i.e., emissions 
trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)), and 
iv) funding of climate measures in developing countries. The emphasis here is on compliance 
and the Kyoto mechanisms, since they are assumed to be of particular interest to business. 
Section 4 covers business implications of the climate agreement. Section 5 discusses the 
                                                     
1 The official name of the Climate Convention is the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the UNFCCC. 
2 The Bonn agreement is presented in the document UNFCCC, 2001. 
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prospects for the Kyoto Protocol and an analysis of the present and future position of the US. 
Finally, section 6 explores the challenges of harmonizing different national and regional 
emissions trading initiatives, and trading under the Kyoto Protocol, particularly with respect 
to trading between the US and countries within “the Kyoto block.” 
 
2 Negotiation positions of major Parties 
One of the challenges of the negotiations under the Buenos Aires plan of action has been to 
bridge the Parties’ different views and positions on important components of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Slide 1 shows some major Parties’ positions on sinks and supplementarity up to 
early 2000 or November 2001 (COP7) (compare with the change in positions depicted in 
Slide 3). Along the horizontal axis, some Parties favored soft rules on sinks (LULUCF) that 
would make it possible for many countries to account for sizeable volumes of carbon fixation 
in living or dead biomass stock as part of fulfilling their Kyoto target. Other Parties, such as 
the EU, favored stricter rules, arguing that scientific knowledge in the area is lacking at 
present, that there are many technical difficulties, and that soft rules would undermine the 
Kyoto targets and incentives to de-carbonize energy systems. Along the vertical axis, the 
Parties’ position on the supplementarity clause of the Kyoto Protocol is shown, where the idea 
is to focus the Parties’ attention on domestic actions to mitigate emissions.3 The so-called 
Umbrella Group (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, 
and the USA) favored soft rules on supplementarity, which would imply no quantified ceiling 
on the use of the Kyoto mechanisms, whereas the EU and developing countries (G77/China) 
favored stricter rules.4 At the Buenos Aires conference, the EU proposed that “a concrete 
ceiling on the use of the flexibility mechanisms has to be defined in quantitative and 
qualitative terms….” Before COP5 in Bonn in 1999, the EU elaborated this proposal into a 
formula-based approach to define an absolute ceiling on using the Kyoto mechanisms, 
roughly equivalent to limiting the purchase and sale of quotas to 50% of the required 
emissions reductions to meet the national Kyoto targets. 
 
Slide 2 presents a similar position map as Slide 1, but now with funding of climate measures 
in developing countries along the horizontal axis and compliance along the vertical axis. 
Japan, Russia and Australia have resisted setting specified amounts for industrialized 
countries to transfer to the three funds under the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 
that support developing countries in coping with the challenges of climate change. In earlier 
proposals by the President of COP6, Dutch minister of environment Jan Pronk, a figure of one 
billion USD annually was mentioned. In contrast, developing countries, the EU and some 
other countries favored a specified funding level. In terms of compliance to the Kyoto 
Protocol, countries such as the USA, the EU and Canada argued for a strict regime as an 
important underpinning of the environmental efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol and a solid 
                                                     
3 Article 17 on emissions trading states that “Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic 
actions ….” 
4 Another important conflict area was the degree of fungibility between the flexibility mechanisms and 
the rules of banking of surplus quotas to the next target period. Developing countries argued that only a 
surplus generated through domestic emission mitigation actions, without counting quotas bought 
through the flexibility mechanisms, would be valid for transferal to the next target period. 
Industrialized countries wanted quotas acquired through the flexibility mechanisms to have the same 
validity as a surplus generated through domestic actions to reduce emissions. The compromise struck 
led to the adoption of a new unit named removal units (RMU) generated from sink activities in 
industrialized countries that cannot be banked (see section 4). 
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basis for the Kyoto mechanisms. This position has been opposed by Japan in particular, but 
also by Russia and Australia, since these countries have argued for a softer compliance 
regime. Japan managed to have “legal” removed from the wording “To adopt, at its sixth 
session, a legal instrument on procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance as an 
integral part of the Kyoto Protocol,” and to postpone the final decision on compliance to the 
first meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP), which can take place only after the 
Protocol has entered into force.  
Slide 1. Some Parties’ position on sinks and supplementarity 
 
Some Parties’ positions on 
sinks and supplementarity
Strict
Soft Strict
Sinks
Supplementarity
G77/China
USA, Canada, Japan, 
Russia, Australia Norway
EU
Source: CICERO
 
 
Slide 2.  Some Parties’ positions on compliance and funding 
Some Parties’ positions on 
compliance and funding
Strict
Soft
Specified level
Funding of climate measures in 
developing countries
Compliance
G77/China
Japan, Russia, 
Australia
EU
Source: CICERO
Non-specified level
USA
Canada, Norway
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Slide 3 presents the dynamics of the positions on the same issues as in Slide 1 and 2. We see 
that the positions on supplementarity were more or less fixed from the Kyoto conference in 
1997 until summer 2000, where Parties prepared for COP6 in The Hague. The positions on 
sinks and compliance were relatively fixed up to summer 2001 and COP6-2 in Bonn, where 
the EU and G77/China in particular had to give in on their strict positions to make an accord 
achievable in Bonn. The countries fighting for soft rules, particularly Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and Russia won this battle. Thus the end result was a weaker Kyoto Protocol than what 
many observers had anticipated after the Kyoto conference in the sense that there is a large 
opening for sinks, that it is more or less up to a country to decide if the requirement of 
supplementarity in the use of the Kyoto mechanisms is met, and that sanctions in the case of 
non-compliance seem to be relatively mild.  
  
Slide 3. Changing positions on sinks, compliance, and supplementarity, 1997–
2001 
Changing positions on sinks, compliance, 
and supplementarity, 1997-2001
Source: CICERO
1997, COP3 1998, COP4 1999, COP5 2000, COP6-1 2001, COP6-2
Strict
supplementarity
Soft 
supplementarity Umbrella group*
•Umbrella group: Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Russia, and USA (plus a few more)
EU
Strict compliance
Soft compliance Australia, Japan, Russia
G77/China, Canada, EU, Norway, 
USA
Sinks, soft
Sinks, strict rules G77/China, EU, Norway
Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Russia, USA
COP7
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3 The Bonn and Marrakech agreements 
The four main issue areas of the Bonn and Marrakech agreements are shown in Slide 4. 
 
Slide 4. The Bonn and Marrakech agreements 
 
The Bonn and Marrakech agreements
Four main areas:
 Compliance
 Land-use, Land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)
 The Kyoto mechanisms: Emissions trading (ET), Joint 
Implementation (JI), and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
 Funding for developing countries 
Source: CICERO
 
 
3.1 Compliance 
 
Slide 5 lists the main contents of the two accords on compliance to the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The Compliance Committee consists of 20 members. It is divided into a facilitative branch 
and an enforcement branch. In addition there is a bureau consisting of the chairperson and the 
vice-chairperson for each of the two branches and a plenary consisting of all members of the 
Committee. The chairperson and vice-chairperson of each branch must represent a developing 
country Party and an industrialized country Party. Each of the branches consists of one 
member from each of the five regional groups of the United Nations, one member from the 
small island developing countries, two members from industrialized countries, and two 
members from developing countries. 
 
The facilitative branch is “responsible for providing advice and facilitation to Parties in 
implementing the Protocol, and for promoting compliance by Parties with their commitments 
under the Protocol”. The branch is specifically responsible for reviewing the Parties’ reports 
showing that the use of the mechanisms is supplemental to domestic action. This indicates 
that supplementarity is not an eligibility criterion for using the mechanisms. 
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The enforcement branch is responsible for determining whether a country (included in Annex 
I) is not in compliance with its Kyoto target, methodological and reporting requirements, and 
eligibility requirements under the Kyoto mechanisms. 
 
The Committee receives questions of implementation from reports of expert review teams, 
together with any comments by the Party subject to the report, or other Parties. The bureau of 
the Committee distributes the questions of implementation to one of the two branches in 
accordance with their particular mandates. A preliminary examination must be completed 
within three weeks. The Party subject to the report must be informed of the process and can 
comment on all relevant information. The Party can designate one or more persons to 
represent it. Within ten weeks of receiving notification of a decision to proceed with the 
implementation question, the Party can make a submission in writing to the enforcement 
branch. If the implementation question relates to eligibility for the flexibility mechanisms an 
expedited procedure is called for. After a final decision has been made by the enforcement 
branch, the Party in question may appeal to the Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol if the question is related to meeting its Kyoto target and if 
“it has been denied due process.” In terms of meeting its target for the first Kyoto period, a 
Party can continue to buy quotas through the flexibility mechanisms from this target period 
up to 100 days after the date set for the completion of the expert review process for the last 
year of the first Kyoto target period. 
 
The Compliance Committee must base decisions on consensus. If consensus is not possible, a 
majority of at least three quarters of the members present and voting is required to make a 
decision. An additional requirement in the enforcement branch is a majority both among 
industrialized country members and developing country members present and voting. 
 
In case of non-compliance with regard to the Kyoto Protocol emissions target, the key 
concept is the requirement to “restore non-compliance”5 to ensure environmental integrity. 
Thus the country must present a plan demonstrating how it intends to comply with the 
Protocol in the future. Furthermore, the country must comply with the national reporting 
procedure and with the prerequisites for using the Kyoto mechanisms. However, a country 
will not lose its eligibility to use the mechanisms even if not all reporting requirements are 
met.6 If the greenhouse gas emissions of a country are for instance 10 Mt Carbon above the 
Kyoto target in the period 2008–12, it must cover its deficit plus 30% in the next budget 
period (for instance 2013–17); that is, in the next commitment period it must reduce its 
emissions by 13 Mt carbon plus its original target for that period. In addition, the country 
cannot sell quotas (AAUs under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol) until compliance is 
restored. Compliance can be restored through domestic mitigation or use of the Kyoto 
mechanisms. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol in Article 18 states that legally binding consequences shall be adopted as 
an amendment to the Protocol. Thus a Party may ratify the Protocol without necessarily 
accepting binding consequences of non-compliance. The Conference of the Parties serving as 
the first Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol is to decide on the legal form of the 
procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance. The first Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol can first take place after the Protocol has entered into force. 
                                                     
5 In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, “restore non-compliance” means to return to a state of 
compliance. 
6 Specifically this refers to reporting of adverse impacts of climate change and response measures in 
industrialized country Parties on developing country Parties (Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol). 
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Slide 5. Compliance 
Compliance
• Establishment of a Compliance Committee with a facilitative branch, an 
enforcement branch, and a bureau
• Restoration of non-compliance plus 30% deduction rate in the next budget 
period
• Suspension of eligibility to sell quotas until compliance is restored
• The legal form of procedures and mechanisms postponed until first 
Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
 
3.2 Sinks 
 
Slide 6 shows the main contents of the Bonn and Marrakech agreements with regard to sinks 
(i.e., land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)). Final rules for inclusion of 
afforestation and reforestation projects under the CDM will be decided by COP9 (in 2003). 
 
Quotas from LULUCF activities in industrialized countries are defined as ‘removal units’ 
(RMU). Such quotas cannot be banked, that is, transferred to the next budget period.  
 
A Party must demonstrate that the activities have occurred since 1990 and are human-
induced. The accounting of agricultural activities is net-net, which means that net emissions 
or removals over the commitment period less net removals in the base year, times five, should 
be accounted for. A ceiling on eligible forest management activities for each industrialized 
country is specified in Annex Z to the Bonn agreement. The figure is 0 Mt Carbon per year 
for Australia, 12.00 Mt Carbon for Canada, 0.88 Mt Carbon for France, 1.24 Mt Carbon for 
Germany, 13.00 Mt Carbon for Japan, 0.40 Mt Carbon for Norway, 33 Mt Carbon for Russia, 
and 1.11 Mt Carbon for Ukraine. Russia got a ceiling of 17.63 Mt Carbon in Bonn, but the 
other Parties had to give in to its demand of 33 Mt in Marrakech. On the other hand, Russia 
has not yet provided an acceptable inventory of sinks and emissions, which is a prerequisite 
for trading. In addition there is a constraint on sink activities under the CDM, which are 
limited to 1% of base year emissions, times five, due to the commitment period length of five 
years (2008–12). Furthermore sink activities under the CDM are limited to afforestation or 
reforestation projects. However, there are no constraints on generating RMU from 
afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation activities. Cropland management, grazing land 
CICERO Report 2001:5  
An evaluation of business implications of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
8
management, and revegetation are also eligible sink activities for generating RMU. These 
accounting rules apply to the first budget period 2008–12, and may thus change later. 
 
Slide 6. Sinks 
 
Sinks: Land-use, Land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF)
• Forest, cropland and grazing land management, and revegetation are 
eligible activities
• Quotas from LULUCF activities undertaken in industrialized 
countries are named removal units (RMU)
• Net-net accounting of agricultural activities
• A specified ceiling on forest management activities (Appendix Z)
• LULUCF activities under the CDM mechanism limited to 1% of 
1990 emissions, times five (due to the 5-year commitment period 
2008-12) 
• Future reversal of any removal must be accounted for at the 
appropriate point in time
• Technologies relating to fossil fuels that capture and store 
greenhouse gases mentioned
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
Another sink option is technologies relating to fossil fuels that capture and store greenhouse 
gases. Cooperation on the development and diffusion of such technologies is mentioned under 
Article 3.14 of the Protocol as an action industrialized countries should give priority to. This 
article deals with potential adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts on 
developing countries from climate policy measures undertaken in industrialized countries. 
Furthermore the IPCC has been asked to prepare a technical paper on geological carbon 
storage technologies in time for the second Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
3.3 The Kyoto mechanisms 
 
Slide 7 presents an overview of the Kyoto mechanisms and domestic emissions trading, 
featuring units, participants, limits on transfer and bankability.7 Annex B countries are 
industrialized countries and non-Annex B countries are developing countries. 
 
 
                                                     
7 For simplicity, all three Kyoto mechanisms are referred to as “quotas” as long as discrimination 
between them is not important in the context. 
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Slide 8 shows the main contents of the Bonn agreement with regard to the flexibility 
mechanisms (Kyoto mechanisms). As noted earlier, the supplementarity requirement has 
softened compared to some earlier proposals. The wording now is that “the use of the 
mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and domestic action shall thus 
constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet 
its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1.”8 
 
Slide 7. Flexibility mechanisms and units for greenhouse gas emissions 
trading 
 
Flexibility mechanisms and units for greenhouse gas 
emissions trading
Cannot be bankedUnlimited within and 
between Annex B countries. 
Fungible with ERU, CER, 
and AAU.
Annex B countriesCredit
Removal Unit 
(RMU)
Sequestration 
credits in Annex 
B countries
Banking limited 
to 2.5% of a 
Party’s assigned 
amount in Annex 
B
Unlimited within and 
between Annex B countries. 
Fungible with ERU, AAU, 
and RMU. CER from sinks 
activities limited to 1% of 
base year times 5.
Annex B countries 
and non-Annex B 
countries.
Legal entities.
Credit
Certified Emission 
reduction (CER)
Clean 
Development 
Mechanism
Banking limited 
to 2.5% of a 
Party’s assigned 
amount in Annex 
B
Unlimited within and 
between Annex B countries. 
Fungible with CER, AAU, 
and RMU. 
Annex B countries. 
Legal entities.
Credit
Emission Reduction 
Unit (ERU)
Joint 
Implementation
UnlimitedUnlimited within and 
between Annex B countries. 
Fungible with ERU, CER, 
and RMU.
Annex B countries. 
Legal entities.
Quota
Assigned Amount 
unit (AAU)
International 
emissions trading
Depends on 
national design
Depends on national designCompanies and other 
domestic legal entities
QuotaDomestic 
emissions trading
BankabilityLimits to transferParticipantsUnitMechanism
Source: CICERO and Natsource (2001)
 
 
 
To use the flexibility mechanisms, Parties must meet a number of eligibility criteria, where 
the strictest applies to participation in international emissions trading. The most important 
criteria are that the Party must establish its assigned amount, a national system for estimating 
man-made emissions by source, and a national registry, as well as submit the newest annual 
inventory and the supplementary information on the assigned amount. The issue of whether 
meeting the reporting requirements of LULUCF (sink) activities should be an eligibility 
criterion for using the mechanisms is postponed to the first Conference of the Parties serving 
as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. If the eligibility criteria for one or more of the 
flexibility mechanisms is not met, the Party’s right to use that or those mechanisms is 
suspended. The issue of eligibility to use the mechanisms in cases of non-compliance with the 
Kyoto target was deferred until the first Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Natsource 2001). The argument behind this decision was that 
denial of eligibility would be binding and thus must be taken by the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol in an amendment. 
 
                                                     
8 Annex I comprises industrialized countries as defined by the UNFCCC. 
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The principle of transparency regarding national registries is emphasized. For each account, 
the identity of the holder and the total quantity of quotas at the beginning of each year will be 
public information. Meetings of the JI Supervisory Committee and the CDM Executive Board 
must be open to all Parties and observers.   
 
Legal entities that want to participate in international emissions trading must be authorized by 
a Party, but the Party remains responsible for its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Party must be eligible for international emissions trading for the legal entity to participate. 
However, a Party may buy quotas even if it is not in compliance. Regarding CDM quotas 
from afforestation and reforestation, the Party must assure that they constitute no more than 
1% of base year emissions, times five. The CDM Executive Board is responsible for 
accrediting operational (legal) entities. Regarding JI, a Party may authorize legal entities to 
participate under its responsibility. Legal entities can be domestic (such as a private or public 
company or organization) or an international organization. 
 
The CDM Executive Board is required to supervise the CDM, under the authority and 
guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Decisions must be made by consensus if possible, otherwise by a majority of three-
fourths of the members present and voting, and with a majority among developing country 
members and industrialized country members. The Board was established in Marrakech. John 
Ashe from Antigua and Barbuda is the chair. There are alternates for each member of the 
board. Georg Børsting from Norway is an alternate member from industrialized countries. 
There is still a lot of work on developing methodologies for baselines and verification of 
projects to be done by the CDM Executive Board. 
 
The Supervisory Committee for Joint Implementation will be established, with 
responsibilities similar to those of the Executive Board of the Clean Development 
Mechanism. A major task of the committee is to issue JI quotas (ERUs). The committee 
comprises ten members where three are from economies in transition, three are from other 
industrialized countries, three are from developing countries, and one is from the small island 
developing states. 
 
Each Party participating in the CDM must designate a national authority for the CDM. 
 
A Party can participate in the JI mechanism in two ways: First, if a host Party is eligible to 
participate in international emissions trading, it may then verify quotas from a JI project. 
Second, if a host Party that does not meet the eligibility requirements for international 
emission trading (due to inadequate registry and reporting systems) but is still eligible to 
participate in JI, it may participate in a project cycle similar to that for CDM projects where 
the quotas are to be verified through the JI Supervisory Committee. 
 
The only Kyoto mechanism with a levy is the CDM, where 2% of the certified emissions 
reductions issued for a CDM project activity go toward financing the Kyoto Protocol 
adaptation fund (see section 4.4). CDM projects in least developed countries are exempted 
from this levy. This means that 2% of the credits produced by a CDM project are sold in the 
market and the earnings transferred to the adaptation fund. Another fee to cover 
administrative expenses of the CDM will be introduced later. In terms of JI projects, a share 
of the proceeds will be used to cover administrative costs related to the JI Supervisory 
Committee (IETA 2001).  
 
With regard to both JI and CDM it is stated that Annex I Parties are to refrain from using 
credits generated from nuclear facilities to meet their Kyoto commitments. There is some 
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uncertainty with regard to whether the wording “are to refrain from using” should be 
interpreted as “must not use,” so the final legal text and its interpretation should be 
scrutinized. 
 
The Bonn agreement states that it is the host Party’s prerogative to confirm whether a CDM 
project assists in achieving sustainable development. Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol outlines 
that the CDM has the dual objective of both helping Annex I Parties meet their commitments 
and assisting the host developing country in achieving sustainable development. Allowing the 
host country to ascertain the sustainability of potential CDM projects is a simplified approach 
that probably saves transaction costs, but may create uncertainty about the sustainability 
effects of CDM projects. The host country’s evaluation would depend on the priority given to 
sustainability compared to benefits in terms of e.g. technology transfer through CDM 
projects. In the absence of clear and standardized criteria for sustainability, a CDM project 
that is acceptable in one host country may not be acceptable in another host country. A 
requirement that JI projects contribute to sustainable development is included in Slide 8 since 
this is mentioned in the Bonn agreement (UNFCCC 2001). 
 
 
Slide 8. The flexibility mechanisms 
The flexibility mechanisms
• No specified ceiling on trade (”domestic action shall thus constitute a 
significant element of ...”)
• A 2% fee on the CDM mechanism (transferred to the adaptation fund)
• Refrain from nuclear power
• Host party to confirm whether a CDM or JI project contributes to 
sustainable development
• Fast-track for small-scale CDM projects
• CDM crediting from January 2000
• Fungibility between the mechanisms
• AAUs, JI and CDM quotas can be banked (limited to 2.5% of Kyoto 
target for JI and CDM) 
• Commitment period reserve for all quota types
Source: CICERO
 
 
The Bonn agreement establishes a fast-track procedure for small-scale CDM projects, 
whereby renewable energy projects with maximum output capacity less than 15 megawatts, 
energy efficiency improvement projects that reduce energy consumption by up to 15 gigawatt 
hours per year, and other project activities that reduce anthropogenic emissions by less than 
15 kilotonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents annually can benefit from simplified modalities 
and procedures. 
 
Unilateral CDM projects are allowed. This means that a developing country Party can 
develop a CDM project without an Annex I partner and sell the quotas (CERs) on the market. 
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CDM projects can earn credits from 1 January 2000, provided that they are submitted for 
registration before 31 December 2005. The Parties involved in a CDM project can either 
choose a maximum ten-year crediting period with no renewal possibilities, or a maximum of 
seven years which may be renewed up to two more times after informing the CDM Executive 
Board that the baseline is still valid or has been updated due to new data. JI projects that were 
initiated in 2000 or later can be accepted, but crediting can first take place from 2008.  
 
Fungibility between the Kyoto mechanisms refers to the degree to which quotas and credits 
generated through them can be interchanged at the global market, and thus function as one 
commodity in one market. If there are three segregated markets for the mechanisms, the 
fungibility is low. The Bonn and Marrakech agreements state that the national quotas defined 
by the Kyoto target (AAUs), removal units (from sink projects) and all three mechanisms can 
be employed to meet a Party’s Kyoto commitments, thus supporting high fungibility at that 
level. However, due to some differences in the rules of the mechanisms – for instance with 
regard to who can participate, different constraints on the use of the mechanisms, and the fee 
placed only on the CDM – there is going to be less than full fungibility between the them. 
 
Even if removal units are not directly transferable to the next target period, they may be 
transferred indirectly since other quota types can be transferred and there is fungibility 
between all quota types. However, there is a limit on transferal of JI and CDM quotas to the 
next target period equal to 2.5% of the Kyoto target.  
 
With the aim of preventing Parties from overselling their quotas and thus making compliance 
to their Kyoto target later impossible, a commitment period reserve rule was adopted. Slide 9 
explains the main features of this rule. At all times during the budget period 2008–12, a 
country should keep a reserve equal to 90% of its Kyoto target in the national registry. Thus 
the net sum of all transfers must be less than 10%. If a country in its most recent verified 
national report has emissions lower than 90% of its Kyoto target, this country would be 
allowed to transfer quotas equal to the difference between reported emissions and the Kyoto 
target. The 90% rule could pose a challenge for some countries that risk large companies 
wanting to transfer a sizeable share of their quotas to other countries, which could 
compromise the commitment period reserve rule. In designing a national emissions trading 
scheme, it is expected that the authorities will build in features that reduce the possibility of 
such occurrences. If a Party’s reserve reaches less than 90%, the UNFCCC secretariat must 
notify that Party and set a 30-day time-limit to bring its holdings to the sufficient level. 
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Slide 9. Commitment period reserve 
Commitment period reserve
• A country shall keep a reserve equal to 90% of its Kyoto target in its national 
registry, counted as all valid quota types and quotas for the first commitment period 
• This means that net transfer of quotas to registries in other countries should at all 
times through the budget period 2008-12 be less than 10% of the Kyoto target of a 
country
• Alternatively, a country can transfer to other countries up to five times (due to the 
five-year budget period) the difference between its annual emissions according to the 
newest verified national report and its Kyoto target (provided the reported and 
verified emissions are lower than 90% of the Kyoto target)
• The motivation is to prevent nations from overselling their quotas and thus making 
compliance to their Kyoto targets later impossible
• If large companies for some reason want to transfer a large share of their quotas to 
registries in other countries, this could be in conflict with the reserve requirement of 
a country
• The national quota system must be designed to fulfill the requirement of a 
commitment period reserve 
Source: CICERO
 
3.4 Funding 
 
Slide 10 shows the decisions on funding of climate policy measures in developing countries. 
 
Altogether three funds under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have been established. 
The aim of the Special Climate Change Fund is to finance activities, programs and measures 
related to climate change in the areas of adaptation, technology transfer, resource 
management, and to assist developing countries highly dependent on fossil fuel production in 
diversifying their economies. The aim of the Least Developed Countries Fund is to support a 
work program for this group of countries, including National Adaptation Programs of Action. 
The aim of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund is to finance concrete adaptation projects and 
programs in developing countries that are Parties to the Protocol. No specific amount to be 
transferred to these funds is mentioned, apart from the 2% fee on the CDM to the adaptation 
fund. The group of countries shown in the last bullet point of Slide 10 made a joint statement 
at the same time as the Bonn agreement was announced that they will transfer USD 410 
million annually to these funds by 2005. It seems that this promise, even if it is outside of the 
Kyoto Protocol, was required to have the developing countries accept the political 
compromise of the Bonn agreement. 
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Slide 10. Funding 
Funding
• Special Climate Change Fund and a Least-developed Countries Fund 
under the UNFCCC
• The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
• Amounts not specified
• The EU, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland to
contribute USD 410 million annually to these funds from 2005
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
 
4 Business implications 
In this section we discuss business implications of the ratification ready Kyoto Protocol, with 
a focus on compliance and the three flexibility mechanisms international emissions trading, JI 
and CDM. 
 
The main achievement of the Bonn and Marrakech accords is to give clear policy signals to 
business: emissions of greenhouse gases will cost you and you should be planning for a low-
carbon future. Likewise the emissions of other greenhouse gases will be restricted. 
Furthermore, the operating rules for the flexibility mechanisms are now in place. Even if there 
are some restrictions on the use and fungibility of the flexibility mechanisms, the decisions 
made are mostly favorable for an efficient working of the emission and quota markets. The 
early start and relative certainty of the CDM makes it particularly interesting for business to 
learn and get into position before 2008. As long as the USA does not fully participate there 
will be a much larger uncertainty for American business than business in other countries with 
regard to regulatory future. 
 
4.1 Compliance 
If a Party is not in compliance with its commitments, its eligibility to sell quotas under 
international emissions trading could be suspended. In that case, firms authorized by the Party 
to trade such quotas would also have their right to sell suspended. However, they would still 
be allowed to buy quotas.  
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One aspect of a softer compliance system as part of the Kyoto Protocol is a weaker 
foundation for the Kyoto mechanisms and thus greater uncertainty with regard to future 
demand for quotas and consequently quota prices. 
 
4.2 The flexibility mechanisms 
Even if the finalized Kyoto Protocol provides adequate guidelines for national legislative 
bodies to implement the Protocol and the mechanisms, for the most part legislation defining 
the regulatory framework to govern business still remains to be developed. 
 
Full fungibility (transferability) between units from the flexibility mechanisms and removal 
units implies that transaction costs are reduced and the liquidity of the markets increases, 
which is important for business since cost-effectiveness is improved. Even if removal units 
cannot be banked to the second target period, this is of less importance as long as the other 
units can be banked and there is full fungibility between them. Thus removal units can be 
used for compliance in the first target period and, for instance, assigned amount units banked. 
Stakeholders should also be aware of the 2.5 % limit on banking of units from JI and CDM 
compared to the initial Kyoto target. Thus these units will be less flexible than assigned 
amount units, and this may be reflected in their price. If there should be a surplus of removal 
units in the first target period they may be dumped in the market and thus lower the quota 
price. Given these rules, the preferred unit for banking should be AAUs from emissions 
trading or from the national quotas defined by the Kyoto target, whereas the other units can be 
used for compliance purposes. 
 
Business in a country is dependent on the eligibility of the Party to engage in international 
emissions trading, JI and CDM. If the Party fails to meet the criteria for a mechanism and is 
suspended from using it, companies in the country will encounter the same problems. 
 
The emphasis on public access to information regarding the identity of an account holder and 
quantity of units may be seen as a problem for some companies. However, this can be 
circumvented by differentiating between a holding account and an anonymous trading 
account with a broker (IETA 2001). Likewise the transparency of deliberations in the JI 
Supervisory Committee and the CDM Executive Board may be seen as a risk for losing 
competitive advantages by some companies (op. cit.). 
 
The commitment period reserve requirement could affect quota trading of large companies. If 
a large amount of quotas is transferred from the national account and the 90% floor is met, the 
UN transaction log would interfere and thus potentially stop a company from selling these 
quotas abroad. Consequently quota trading between countries will be more complicated. This 
could lead to relatively more interest in the CDM. 
 
Joint implementation 
The price of JI quotas are likely to rise when a levy is introduced to cover administrative 
expenses. However, a similar levy will be put on CDM quotas, and in addition there is a 2 % 
levy on CDM projects to finance the adaptation fund under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The Clean Development Mechanism 
Since there is a limit of 1% annually (out of base year emissions) on the purchase of 
(inexpensive) CDM quotas from afforestation and reforestation projects, companies that want 
to buy such quotas must get approval from the national authority. Either the approval can be 
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based on a “first come, first serve” basis, or the national authority could establish some type 
of auctioning of these quotas. 
 
All entities selling or buying CDM quotas can only do so if the authorizing Party is eligible to 
participate in the CDM mechanism. This means that both the host Party and the investing 
Party must be eligible to participate, which may cause problems for companies engaged in 
CDM projects in countries where the eligibility criteria is most difficult to meet. 
 
The host country is responsible for confirming whether a CDM project assists in achieving 
sustainable development. The lack of clear methods and criteria for evaluation of 
sustainability means that one project type may be accepted in one country but rejected in 
another country. This is a disadvantage in terms of environmental integrity and cost-
effectiveness of the CDM mechanism. For business, it means higher transaction costs since 
the transferability of a project type across countries is reduced. 
 
5 The future of the climate policy regime 
5.1 Prospects for the Kyoto Protocol 
 
 
Slide 11 notes some points on the prospects of the Kyoto Protocol and thus the climate policy 
regime. A number of countries, including Japan and the EU have declared their intent to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol by the next Earth summit ‘Rio+10’ in September 2002. However, it is still 
the case that the fate of the Kyoto Protocol depends on the final willingness of countries such 
as Russia, Japan, Australia, and Canada to ratify the Protocol. Since the USA (which is 
responsible for 36.1% of carbon dioxide emissions among industrialized countries in 1990) 
has rejected ratification, most of these countries must ratify the Protocol for it to enter into 
force. Russian ratification is required under all circumstances (Russia is responsible for 
17.4% of the emissions), whereas Japanese ratification (Japan is responsible for 8.5% of the 
emissions) is not required if (almost) all other industrialized countries ratify. The entry into 
force threshold is that countries representing at least 55% of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions 
among industrialized countries must ratify the Protocol, thus the USA plus countries 
representing more than 8.9% of these emissions can block the Protocol. 
 
In the best case, enough countries could ratify the Protocol to make it enter into force late in 
2002 or first half of 2003. Thus in the best case, the first meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can take place in 2003. At this 
meeting the Compliance Committee could be elected. From 2004 the national systems for 
accounting and reporting could be established, and from 2005 the final national assigned units 
established, to provide a basis for starting emissions trading. 
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Slide 11. Prospects for the Kyoto Protocol 
Prospects for the Kyoto Protocol
• Will Russia, Japan, Australia and Canada ratify the protocol?
• In the best case the protocol could enter into force late next year (the World 
summit ‘Rio plus 10’ takes place in South Africa in September 2002)
• The parties are to show demonstrable progress in meeting the protocol 
commitments by 2005; and they must engage in negotiations on targets for 
new budget periods by the same year
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
 
5.2 The United States’ position 
 
Slide 12 presents some points on the American position and likely consequences for the 
climate regime. A number of analyses show that US withdrawal will reduce quota prices on 
the global market due to the large potential quota demand of the United States (see e.g. 
Hagem and Holtsmark 2001). This will benefit buyers of quotas, but will also give weaker 
incentives for domestic climate measures and the development of new efficient, green 
technologies within countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Under all circumstances 
the USA is likely to develop its own climate strategy and be interested in establishing a 
domestic emissions trading system. There are good reasons to believe that the USA will allow 
American companies to meet, at least in part, their domestically fixed emissions reduction or 
limitation targets through participation in the Kyoto mechanisms. The authorities are 
interested in maintaining and developing US relations with important regions and countries 
such as the EU, Russia and China for economic, strategic and political reasons, apart from 
collaboration in the area of climate politics. Furthermore, such a policy might facilitate a later 
entry into the Kyoto Protocol regime. A high future flexibility in this area should be 
beneficial whatever the present climate policy looks like. American companies would be keen 
to participate in the global markets to gain experience, and also with a view to possible future 
re-entry by the USA. In addition, the companies could save expenses if the quota price is 
lower on the international market. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol could favor the participation 
of American companies in the Kyoto mechanisms since this might increase the chance of later 
US entry into the Protocol. The USA may choose to follow the definitions and rules of the 
Kyoto mechanisms or develop their own variants, which will have consequences for 
transaction costs, see section 5. 
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Slide 12. The United States’ position 
The position of the United States
• The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol reduces quota demand and 
thereby reduces the quota price
• The United States will develop a national climate policy strategy
• The United States may ratify the protocol later, and thus might participate 
in the second budget period (2013-17)
• The United States is likely to develop its own emission trading system
• American companies could be allowed to trade quotas with parties to the 
protocol as part of meeting targets defined under a national climate strategy
• The USA can choose quotas similar to the Kyoto mechanisms, or their own 
variants (ET-US, JI-US, CDM-US)
•The USA would be interested in quota trade with EU, China, Russia, and 
other countries for both economic, strategic and political reasons
Source: CICERO
 
 
 
6 Harmonizing quota trading systems 
Slide 13 depicts the main trading blocks in the global greenhouse gas quota market. The 
“Kyoto block” is divided into three parts: the OECD (Annex II); economies in transition to a 
market economy (EITs, countries that are a member of Annex I but not Annex II); and 
developing countries (G77/China; non-Annex I Parties). The slide shows how the various 
Kyoto mechanisms can be applied by a block for trading quotas with other blocks. If trading 
between the Kyoto block and the USA is allowed, this can take place through the Kyoto 
mechanisms (ET, JI and CDM) or through American versions (US-ET, US-JI, or US-CDM). 
In the figure it is assumed that American companies situated in the USA can only buy quotas, 
and are thus not able to sell quotas on the global market due to the fact that the national target 
for the USA, however that is specified, is not part of the Kyoto Protocol. However, there is a 
possibility that American firms are allowed to sell JI credits on the global market since these 
are project-based. Branches of American companies situated within the Kyoto block, for 
instance in Europe, are allowed to participate fully in the Kyoto mechanisms. 
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Slide 13. Quota trading blocks 
Quota trading blocks
OECD
Economies in 
transition
The USA
American firms
situated in the 
USA
G77/China
ET, JI
Source: CICERO
CDM
CDM
ET, JI or
US-ET, US-JI
ET, JI or
US-ET, US-JI CDM or US-
CDM
The Kyoto block
 
 
Slide 14 presents some noteworthy points for the design of emissions trading systems to 
reduce transaction costs.  
 
Slide 14. Harmonizing quota trading systems 
Harmonizing quota trading systems
• There are initiatives to launch quota trading systems by 2008 or earlier in the 
EU (from 2005), Denmark (from 2001), the United Kingdom (from 2002), the 
Netherlands (from 2005), Norway (from 2005), and Australia, Canada, Sweden
and some other countries
• A number of features of the national and regional initiatives differ from one 
another
• The features of an American quota trading system are still uncertain
• Harmonization of trading rules is required to reduce transaction costs between 
countries both before 2008 (e.g. linking national systems with the EU trading 
scheme) and after 2008 (connecting national systems to the Kyoto Protocol 
system)
• Transaction costs are lowest when all quotas can be regarded as one 
commodity, and there is no need for risk adjustments of the price according to 
origin (i.e. seller liability)
• Transaction costs are lower the higher the level of fungibility between 
emissions trading, the CDM, and Joint Implementation
Source: CICERO  
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There are a number of emissions trading systems initiatives with differing features, but this 
should not give rise to significantly higher transaction costs as long as the essential features 
are the same (see Slide 14). The simplest solution in this regard is to establish the finalized 
rules for the Kyoto mechanisms as the standard in all systems, also for a domestic system in 
the USA. Transaction costs are lowest when all quotas can be regarded as one commodity, 
even if such an ideal situation is not likely for even the Kyoto mechanisms alone. 
 
Slide 15 shows quota system features that are important for harmonizing different quota 
trading systems on the background of a number of different initiatives in single countries and 
the EU to establish domestic systems before the first Kyoto target year 2008.  
 
 
Slide 15. Important features for harmonization of quota trading systems to 
reduce transaction costs 
Important features for harmonization of quota 
trading systems to reduce transaction costs
Source: CICERO
+Sanctions on non-compliance
+Quota allocation principles
+
+
Important for 
harmonization
Strict reporting and verification 
rules
+Participation by private and 
public entities
+Sector and greenhouse gas 
coverage
Quota definition and 
measurement
Less important for 
harmonization - national 
authorities may choose 
different solutions
Quota system
features
 
 
Furthermore, harmonization of quota system features is important to minimize transaction 
costs in the case of trading between the USA and the Kyoto block. Thus the table presented 
indicates what features the USA might want to build into their domestic system to facilitate 
participation in the Kyoto mechanisms. The slide shows that the critical features for 
harmonization of quota trading systems are quota definition and measurement, strict reporting 
and verification rules, and sanctions on non-compliance. Features like sector and greenhouse 
gas coverage, what legal entities are allowed to participate, and quota allocation system are of 
less importance. Note that the Kyoto target implementation cost of a country depends not only 
on low transaction costs. Implementation costs are reduced if there is the widest possible 
coverage of sectors, private and public entities, and greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Thus points four and five in the table are important from an implementation cost 
perspective. 
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